One of the most striking aspects is how reforms often fail not because societies resist change, but because intermediary elites have little incentive to support reforms that would dissolve their privileged position.
Modernization can threaten elites long before it empowers majorities.
Thank you for the article, it draws some interesting points as do many of the comments. I see Europe's problems as having multiple dimensions, with only partial parallels to the case of the Ottomans: composition, political authority, established interests, sun-"national" administration, global context. In then Ottoman Empire the Sunni Turks were a pluraity minority, and unlike the Hapsburg Austrians they weren't indigenous to the space they came to dominate. To the established population's if the Balkans and Anatolia they were seen as illegitimate: Muslim invaders that had to be evicted like with Iberia (and rebellions were a constant feature throughout Ottoman history). Even amongst the Muslim Arabs the Turks were viewed as exogenous: barbaric nomads, uncultured and not real Muslims. During the Tanzimat reforms slavery was still ongoing for non-Muslims. The history and composition of the empire didn't favour secular republicanism, and the Turks lacked the authority to implement it: political, historical and technical/administrative- they were viewed as incompetent and were already in the 2nd century of constant defeats by neighbours. This was made worse by the banning of the printing presses in prior centuries for Muslims who thus faced mass illiteracy, while Christians and Jews were pulling ahead in the 19th century due to literacy and multilingualism. This was deeply resented by Muslims, who viewed themselves superior and led to deadly pogroms and riots: the Muslim was superior, the infidel was vile and had to pay hommage and Jizya (in his ancestral lands!). For nationalist reasons the local administration was anti-national, no regional authorities with compétences other than exploitative tax-farming, who were seen more as sellouts and collaborators to the oppresers. Contrast this with the Hapsburgs, who had administrative authority, shared religion, greater meritocracy and competent regional elites. The situation in the "multicultural" EU is quite different: nation states are legitimate, but the elites are losing legitimacy due to swlf-serving politics that fail and so they retreat to Brussels to add a super-national layer of defense from public cries for changes. There is a well educated population that has a huge intergenerational transition to make (less pension spending, more investment, break up rent-seeking cartels, streamline administrative state). Too many comfort zones have to be popped, but hard budget constraints will pop them anyway and the choice will be true reform or return to feudalism (as happened here in Greece after 2010).
But I also wonder if it really is so bad. I do think Macron's cardinal sin was giving in to the union led demonstrations. There are many examples of leaders who have been able to "just do things" that were quite unpopular: Thatcher, quintessentially, but also Merkel and Hollande in their own way (to their countries' detriment unfortunately), Meloni, and of course Trump.
Perhaps the monoculture whose existence I hypothesised above, if it does exist, is not really that strong. I certainly don't think it is anything like as strong as the quasi-ethnostates you have described above.
Maybe, as Richard Hanania has long argued in relation to the CRA and civil rights in the US, what thin gruel we call culture today (I do think that we have a much heartier cultural soup but it is not what we commonly call "culture") is largely downstream of law, reinforcing my point about strong leaders just doing things.
Yes, a monoculture has the agility to pivot quickly that a multicultural empire does not have. It is necessary but not sufficient for modernity : you still need to have the will, the balls and the vision to endure impopular and painful reforms to ensure a better future.
So, to "just do things" without your empire exploding, you need a culturally unified polity. Law, on the other hand doesn't appear to me as a fundamental cultural élément of modern occidental culture, but rather a downstream adaptation of culture
And I think that culture is manifestly at least partly downstream of law in many cases that really matter: workplaces, small business formation, hiring, etc. If you prefer one could say that culture is highly responsive to incentives on many margins 😁
I wonder, albeit without great conviction, if the issue in France at least is not so much entrenched cultural divides as an entrenched monoculture that, ironically, is at its strongest in rejection of technological change!
In other words, whilst LFI/EELV/PS are the enemy, they are a symptom not the disease.
So, whilst like the Ottomans, we have an unfit/maladaptive culture, the maladaption is different and almost worse.
I think it's both. We do have subnational ethnic and religious enclaves that do not recognise themselves as part of the nation (they are not, but also do everything not to assimilated), but we also have the left rooting against our national culture and for its fragmentation.
Is it worse ? I don't think so, as the French nation exists, while the Ottoman nation never existed , therefore consensus towards modernisation can still emerge
But again I think that incentives are important: I believe those communities can be significantly weakened by some changes that are certainly within th Overton window currently, notably restricting _all_ benefits to French citizens and a new class of "permanent residents": foreigners with at least 5 years gainful and legal employment.
It would be even better if we could reform employment law and taxation but the former, at least, is nowhere near the Overton window for now.
One of the most striking aspects is how reforms often fail not because societies resist change, but because intermediary elites have little incentive to support reforms that would dissolve their privileged position.
Modernization can threaten elites long before it empowers majorities.
Thank you for the article, it draws some interesting points as do many of the comments. I see Europe's problems as having multiple dimensions, with only partial parallels to the case of the Ottomans: composition, political authority, established interests, sun-"national" administration, global context. In then Ottoman Empire the Sunni Turks were a pluraity minority, and unlike the Hapsburg Austrians they weren't indigenous to the space they came to dominate. To the established population's if the Balkans and Anatolia they were seen as illegitimate: Muslim invaders that had to be evicted like with Iberia (and rebellions were a constant feature throughout Ottoman history). Even amongst the Muslim Arabs the Turks were viewed as exogenous: barbaric nomads, uncultured and not real Muslims. During the Tanzimat reforms slavery was still ongoing for non-Muslims. The history and composition of the empire didn't favour secular republicanism, and the Turks lacked the authority to implement it: political, historical and technical/administrative- they were viewed as incompetent and were already in the 2nd century of constant defeats by neighbours. This was made worse by the banning of the printing presses in prior centuries for Muslims who thus faced mass illiteracy, while Christians and Jews were pulling ahead in the 19th century due to literacy and multilingualism. This was deeply resented by Muslims, who viewed themselves superior and led to deadly pogroms and riots: the Muslim was superior, the infidel was vile and had to pay hommage and Jizya (in his ancestral lands!). For nationalist reasons the local administration was anti-national, no regional authorities with compétences other than exploitative tax-farming, who were seen more as sellouts and collaborators to the oppresers. Contrast this with the Hapsburgs, who had administrative authority, shared religion, greater meritocracy and competent regional elites. The situation in the "multicultural" EU is quite different: nation states are legitimate, but the elites are losing legitimacy due to swlf-serving politics that fail and so they retreat to Brussels to add a super-national layer of defense from public cries for changes. There is a well educated population that has a huge intergenerational transition to make (less pension spending, more investment, break up rent-seeking cartels, streamline administrative state). Too many comfort zones have to be popped, but hard budget constraints will pop them anyway and the choice will be true reform or return to feudalism (as happened here in Greece after 2010).
But I also wonder if it really is so bad. I do think Macron's cardinal sin was giving in to the union led demonstrations. There are many examples of leaders who have been able to "just do things" that were quite unpopular: Thatcher, quintessentially, but also Merkel and Hollande in their own way (to their countries' detriment unfortunately), Meloni, and of course Trump.
Perhaps the monoculture whose existence I hypothesised above, if it does exist, is not really that strong. I certainly don't think it is anything like as strong as the quasi-ethnostates you have described above.
Maybe, as Richard Hanania has long argued in relation to the CRA and civil rights in the US, what thin gruel we call culture today (I do think that we have a much heartier cultural soup but it is not what we commonly call "culture") is largely downstream of law, reinforcing my point about strong leaders just doing things.
Yes, a monoculture has the agility to pivot quickly that a multicultural empire does not have. It is necessary but not sufficient for modernity : you still need to have the will, the balls and the vision to endure impopular and painful reforms to ensure a better future.
So, to "just do things" without your empire exploding, you need a culturally unified polity. Law, on the other hand doesn't appear to me as a fundamental cultural élément of modern occidental culture, but rather a downstream adaptation of culture
It might be so, but Richard Hanania argued this at length in his book (see here for a good review if more sceptical than I am of the core thesis): https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/book-review-the-origins-of-woke
And I think that culture is manifestly at least partly downstream of law in many cases that really matter: workplaces, small business formation, hiring, etc. If you prefer one could say that culture is highly responsive to incentives on many margins 😁
Thank you for sharing this interesting article with your readers.
Thanks! Very interesting as always.
I wonder, albeit without great conviction, if the issue in France at least is not so much entrenched cultural divides as an entrenched monoculture that, ironically, is at its strongest in rejection of technological change!
In other words, whilst LFI/EELV/PS are the enemy, they are a symptom not the disease.
So, whilst like the Ottomans, we have an unfit/maladaptive culture, the maladaption is different and almost worse.
I think it's both. We do have subnational ethnic and religious enclaves that do not recognise themselves as part of the nation (they are not, but also do everything not to assimilated), but we also have the left rooting against our national culture and for its fragmentation.
Is it worse ? I don't think so, as the French nation exists, while the Ottoman nation never existed , therefore consensus towards modernisation can still emerge
I agree that the situation is not so dire.
But again I think that incentives are important: I believe those communities can be significantly weakened by some changes that are certainly within th Overton window currently, notably restricting _all_ benefits to French citizens and a new class of "permanent residents": foreigners with at least 5 years gainful and legal employment.
It would be even better if we could reform employment law and taxation but the former, at least, is nowhere near the Overton window for now.
The Tanzimat failure is real but the lesson isn’t that plural societies can’t modernize.
It’s that trying to force coherence through law and identity, rather than through systems and incentives, produces backlash.
Modern power works when coordination is embedded in infrastructure, not when unity is demanded upfront.
The Ottomans tried to legislate a “we” before building the mechanisms that could sustain it. That’s the deeper failure.